Sutta Pitaka
Dīgha Nikāya – The Long Discourses
DN15: Mahānidāna Sutta – The Great Discourse on Causation
- © Translated from the Pali by Bhante Sujato. (More copyright information)
1. Dependent Origination
dn15:1.1So I have heard.This sutta with its commentary was translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi in his The Great Discourse on Causation. It is the longest and most complex discourse on dependent origination in early Buddhism.At one time the Buddha was staying in the land of the Kurus, near the Kuru town named Kammāsadamma.The Kurukṣetra was an ancient Brahmanical kingdom situated in the region around modern Delhi, bordered by the Ganges in the east, the Sarasvatī in the west, the Himalayas in the north, and the hills of the Aravalli Range in the south. The Mahābharata climaxes with the battle fought there between the Kurus and the Pāṇḍavas. These events, to the extent that they can be established historically, took place several centuries before the Buddha. Kuru marks the north-western extent of the Buddha’s travels. Kammāsadamma is identified with modern Kumashpur in Haryana, about 40 km north of Delhi.
dn15:1.3Then Venerable Ānanda went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and said to him,While we cannot date this text, the fact that Ānanda has evidently been studying deep matters for a long time, that it takes place outside the Buddha’s accustomed locales, and that it builds on teachings found elsewhere, suggests that it happened rather late in the Buddha’s life. At SN12.60 we find the same introduction to a much shorter discourse. “It’s incredible, sir, it’s amazing, in that this dependent origination is deep and appears deep, yet to me it seems as plain as can be.”At SN6.1 (and DN14 in the case of Vipassī), the Buddha hesitated to teach the Dhamma because dependent origination is so hard to see. Ānanda was not only learned and wise, he was a stream enterer who had directly experienced dependent origination (AN10.92), yet he still underestimates it.
dn15:1.6“Don’t say that, Ānanda, don’t say that! This dependent origination is deep and appears deep.The sutta introduce subtle variations in the standard formula as a means to illuminate hidden implications and dimensions. It is because of not understanding and not penetrating this teaching that this population has become tangled like string, knotted like a ball of thread, and matted like rushes and reeds, and it doesn’t escape the places of loss, the bad places, the underworld, transmigration.The Buddha establishes the primary purpose of dependent origination: to understand transmigration so as to be free from it.
dn15:2.1When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for old age and death?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’Dependent origination is here taught in “reverse order” (paṭiloma, Ud1.2), starting with the existential problem: we are all going to die. This factor and the next are resultant, so we cannot solve them directly. If they say, ‘What is a requirement for old age and death?’ you should answer, ‘Rebirth is a requirement for old age and death.’With this the Buddha denies the promise of immortality in this or any other realm.
dn15:2.3When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for rebirth?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for rebirth?’ you should answer, ‘Continued existence is a requirement for rebirth.’“Continued existence” (or “life”) is an encompassing term, including both resultant and causal dimensions.
dn15:2.5When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for continued existence?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for continued existence?’ you should answer, ‘Grasping is a requirement for continued existence.’“Grasping” and “craving” (together with “ignorance” in the full sequence) are the defilements that drive the process on. It is here that the practice of the path takes effect, uprooting them entirely.
dn15:2.7When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for grasping?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for grasping?’ you should answer, ‘Craving is a requirement for grasping.’
dn15:2.9When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for craving?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for craving?’ you should answer, ‘Feeling is a requirement for craving.’The next three factors spell out the process of sense experience that unfolds automatically. Meditation slows it down so it can be seen clearly, but the process remains even for the perfected ones.
dn15:2.11When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for feeling?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for feeling?’ you should answer, ‘Contact is a requirement for feeling.’
dn15:2.13When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for contact?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for contact?’ you should answer, ‘Name and form are requirements for contact.’Here we encounter the first unique feature of this sequence, as normally the six sense fields appear as the condition for contact. The reason for this special presentation becomes clear later on.
dn15:2.15When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for name and form?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for name and form?’ you should answer, ‘Consciousness is a requirement for name and form.’
dn15:2.17When asked, ‘Is there a specific condition for consciousness?’ you should answer, ‘There is.’ If they say, ‘What is a requirement for consciousness?’ you should answer, ‘Name and form are requirements for consciousness.’The mutual conditioning of consciousness with name and form is a further subtlety of this presentation. We have met this idea before in DN14; it also occurs in SN12.65 and SN12.67. Again, implications of this are explored below.
dn15:3.1So: name and form are requirements for consciousness. Consciousness is a requirement for name and form. Name and form are requirements for contact. Contact is a requirement for feeling. Feeling is a requirement for craving. Craving is a requirement for grasping. Grasping is a requirement for continued existence. Continued existence is a requirement for rebirth. Rebirth is a requirement for old age and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, sadness, and distress to come to be.The sequence is recapped in forward order (anuloma, Ud1.1). That is how this entire mass of suffering originates.
dn15:4.1‘Rebirth is a requirement for old age and death’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.The Buddha now takes up each of the terms in more depth. Suppose there were totally and utterly no rebirth for anyone anywhere.This emphatic phrasing drives home that “cessation” (nirodha) is not simply temporary suppression or non-arising, but permanent and complete absence. That is, there were no rebirth of sentient beings into their various realms—of gods, centaurs, spirits, creatures, humans, quadrupeds, birds, or reptiles, each into their own realm. When there’s no rebirth at all, with the cessation of rebirth, would old age and death still be found?”“Rebirth” (jāti) is defined as the birth of a new life, not as simple arising.
dn15:4.4“No, sir.”
dn15:4.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of old age and death, namely rebirth.The various terms for “cause” are used as synonyms (hetu, nidāna, samudaya, paccaya). The purpose of using different terms is not to add nuances, but to reinforce the central meaning and guard against the corruption of meaning; if one word is lost or misunderstood, the meaning of the sentence as a whole is not changed.
dn15:5.1‘Continued existence is a requirement for rebirth’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no continued existence for anyone anywhere. That is, continued existence in the sensual realm, the realm of luminous form, or the formless realm. When there’s no continued existence at all, with the cessation of continued existence, would rebirth still be found?”These realms relate to the kamma that projects consciousness into them. The realms of “luminous form” (rūpabhava) and the “formless” (arūpabhava) are generated by the form and formless attainments respectively. Any other kamma, good or bad, pertains to the sensual realm (kāmabhava). All rebirth takes place in one or other of these realms.
dn15:5.4“No, sir.”
dn15:5.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of rebirth, namely continued existence.
dn15:6.1‘Grasping is a requirement for continued existence’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no grasping for anyone anywhere. That is, grasping at sensual pleasures, views, precepts and observances, and theories of a self. When there’s no grasping at all, with the cessation of grasping, would continued existence still be found?”“Grasping” (upādāna) begins with the primal desire of the senses, but the three other graspings are rather intellectual and sophisticated. Only a grown human being with a developed linguistic ability is able to formulate a view to become attached to, and likewise with attachment to religious observances and vows, and to theories of a self. This is why the bulk of kamma is produced by adult humans, rather than by, say, animals or children, for whom these dimensions of grasping are nascent.
dn15:6.4“No, sir.”
dn15:6.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of continued existence, namely grasping.
dn15:7.1‘Craving is a requirement for grasping’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no craving for anyone anywhere. That is, craving for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and ideas. When there’s no craving at all, with the cessation of craving, would grasping still be found?”“Craving” (taṇhā) is a fundamental desire or urge. Unlike grasping, it is fully active in children and animals. Often it has a threefold definition, which we find below, but in dependent origination it is usually defined in terms of the six senses, which relates it to the items to come.
dn15:7.4“No, sir.”
dn15:7.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of grasping, namely craving.
dn15:8.1‘Feeling is a requirement for craving’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no feeling for anyone anywhere. That is, feeling born of contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. When there’s no feeling at all, with the cessation of feeling, would craving still be found?”The usual threefold definition of feeling (pleasant, painful, neutral) is reframed in terms of the six senses.
dn15:8.4“No, sir.”
dn15:8.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of craving, namely feeling.
dn15:9.1So it is, Ānanda, that feeling gives rise to craving. Craving gives rise to seeking. Seeking gives rise to gaining material things. Gaining material things gives rise to evaluation. Evaluation gives rise to desire and lust. Desire and lust gives rise to attachment. Attachment gives rise to ownership. Ownership gives rise to stinginess. Stinginess gives rise to safeguarding.Here the Buddha introduces another, even more radical, departure from the typical sequence. Rather than continue back to contact and name and form, he branches out in an entirely new direction. These “nine things rooted in craving” are found independently at AN9.23 and DN34, but only here are they integrated with the standard dependent origination. Owing to safeguarding, many bad, unskillful things come to be: taking up the rod and the sword, quarrels, arguments, and disputes, accusations, divisive speech, and lies.While the purpose of the main dependent origination is to disclose the web of conditions that generates the suffering of transmigration, here the Buddha looks at the arising of social conflict and disorder.
dn15:10.1‘Owing to safeguarding, many bad, unskillful things come to be: taking up the rod and the sword, quarrels, arguments, and disputes, accusations, divisive speech, and lies’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.In DN27 Aggaññasutta the Buddha narrates a legend showing how these things arise. The point is not that we should not safeguard (ārakkha) our possessions. It is, rather, that so long as we live in a world where safeguarding possessions is necessary, there will be conflict and violence. Suppose there were totally and utterly no safeguarding for anyone anywhere. When there’s no safeguarding at all, with the cessation of safeguarding, would those many bad, unskillful things still come to be?”
dn15:10.3“No, sir.”
dn15:10.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason for the origination of those many bad, unskillful things, namely safeguarding.
dn15:11.1‘Stinginess gives rise to safeguarding’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.“Stinginess” is macchariya. Suppose there were totally and utterly no stinginess for anyone anywhere. When there’s no stinginess at all, with the cessation of stinginess, would safeguarding still be found?”
dn15:11.3“No, sir.”
dn15:11.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of safeguarding, namely stinginess.
dn15:12.1‘Ownership gives rise to stinginess’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no ownership for anyone anywhere. When there’s no ownership at all, with the cessation of ownership, would stinginess still be found?”
dn15:12.3“No, sir.”
dn15:12.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of stinginess, namely ownership.
dn15:13.1‘Attachment gives rise to ownership’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.There are many words in Pali that approximate the English word “attachment”. Here it is ajjhosāna. Suppose there were totally and utterly no attachment for anyone anywhere. When there’s no attachment at all, with the cessation of attachment, would ownership still be found?”
dn15:13.3“No, sir.”
dn15:13.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of ownership, namely attachment.
dn15:14.1‘Desire and lust gives rise to attachment’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no desire and lust for anyone anywhere. When there’s no desire and lust at all, with the cessation of desire and lust, would attachment still be found?”
dn15:14.3“No, sir.”
dn15:14.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of attachment, namely desire and lust.
dn15:15.1Evaluation gives rise to desire and lust’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.“Evaluation” is vinicchaya. We like to weigh up and consider the pros and cons of different objects of desire. Suppose there were totally and utterly no evaluation for anyone anywhere. When there’s no evaluation at all, with the cessation of evaluation, would desire and lust still be found?”
dn15:15.3“No, sir.”
dn15:15.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of desire and lust, namely evaluation.
dn15:16.1‘Gaining material things gives rise to evaluation’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.Those who have nothing are grateful for any small thing, and do not indulge in picking and choosing. Suppose there were totally and utterly no gaining of material things for anyone anywhere. When there’s no gaining of material things at all, with the cessation of gaining material things, would evaluation still be found?”
dn15:16.3“No, sir.”
dn15:16.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of evaluation, namely the gaining of material things.
dn15:17.1‘Seeking gives rise to gaining material things’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.Our senses are tuned to hunt out and acquire pleasure. Suppose there were totally and utterly no seeking for anyone anywhere. When there’s no seeking at all, with the cessation of seeking, would the gaining of material things still be found?”
dn15:17.3“No, sir.”
dn15:17.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of gaining material things, namely seeking.
dn15:18.1‘Craving gives rise to seeking’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so. Suppose there were totally and utterly no craving for anyone anywhere. That is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for continued existence, and craving to end existence. When there’s no craving at all, with the cessation of craving, would seeking still be found?”This is the normal definition of craving in the four noble truths, supplementing the previous definition in terms of the six senses. Both are included in this sutta to show that they do not contradict, but rather reveal different aspects of the same thing. It is not just sensual desire that drives acquisition. For example, religious people fight over sacred ground or holy objects to gain a place in heaven; or else those driven by nihilism go to any lengths for alcohol or drugs to erase existence.
dn15:18.4“No, sir.”
dn15:18.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of seeking, namely craving. And so, Ānanda, these two things are united by the two aspects of feeling.The threefold analysis of feeling leads to the process of acquisition, while the sixfold analysis of feeling leads to dependent origination.
dn15:19.1‘Contact is a requirement for feeling’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.And now we rejoin the main sequence. Suppose there were totally and utterly no contact for anyone anywhere. That is, contact through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. When there’s no contact at all, with the cessation of contact, would feeling still be found?”People mostly want to enjoy pleasant sensations, in this life and the next, but those sensations depend on a constant supply of the appropriate stimuli.
dn15:19.4“No, sir.”
dn15:19.5“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of feeling, namely contact.
dn15:20.1‘Name and form are requirements for contact’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.Name and form are said to be conditions for contact also at Snp4.11. Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the set of mental phenomena known as name is found. Would labeling contact still be found in the set of physical phenomena?”The “set of mental phenomena known as name” is nāmakāya. Its function depends not any underlying essence, but on the “features” by which it is “made known”; this is a phenomenological analysis.
“Labeling contact” is adhivacanasamphassa; it is the active process by which the mind makes sense of the world by attaching labels to experience. This passage reinforces the linguistic significance of nāma.
dn15:20.3“No, sir.”
dn15:20.4“Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the set of physical phenomena known as form is found. Would impingement contact still be found in the set of mental phenomena?”The “set of physical phenomena known as form” is rūpakāya.
“Impingement contact” is paṭighasamphassa. Here paṭigha refers to the “striking” of physical phenomena against each other, such as light “hitting” the eye. It most commonly appears in this sense in the formula that begins the formless attainments.
dn15:20.5“No, sir.”
dn15:20.6“Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which the set of phenomena known as name and the set of phenomena known as form are found. Would either labeling contact or impingement contact still be found?”Labeling moves from the mind to the world; impingement moves from the world to the mind. Together they create a dynamic two-way process by which we learn about the world and how to make sense of it.
dn15:20.7“No, sir.”
dn15:20.8“Suppose there were none of the features, attributes, signs, and details by which name and form are found. Would contact still be found?”Contact is fundamentally a meeting, normally expressed as the coming together of the sense stimulus (light), the sense organ (eye), and sense consciousness. By skipping the direct mention of the six senses, the Buddha opens another perspective on this process: mental labeling meets sense impingement, each essential to the other, and together making contact possible. The analysis itself exemplifies this process, as it starts by looking at the process from each side, and moves towards integration, seeing them both together.
dn15:20.9“No, sir.”
dn15:20.10“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of contact, namely name and form.
dn15:21.1‘Consciousness is a requirement for name and form’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.Consciousness in dependent origination is normally defined as the six kinds of sense consciousness (SN12.45). The purpose of this is to emphasize that the process of rebirth and transmigration is an empirical process, which depends on the same ordinary consciousness we are experiencing now. Here, once again, by skipping the six senses, a new mode of analysis opens up, which emphasizes the organic growth of the individual. If consciousness were not conceived in the mother’s womb, would name and form coagulate there?”“Conceived” is okkamissatha, literally “descend” or “arrive”.
“Coagulate” assumes the PTS reading samucchissatha (Sanskrit sammurch). I believe this echoes the belief that the embryo is “coagulated” from the mix of blood and semen. Compare the Jain term sammūrcchana, “congealment”, which covers all kinds of birth not from a uterus or spontaneous (Tattvārtha Sūtra 2.35).
Linguistically, this passage through to DN15 is marked with the extremely rare verbal ending -issatha_, which is the middle form of the third person singular conditional.
dn15:21.3“No, sir.”
dn15:21.4“If consciousness, after being conceived in the mother’s womb, were to be miscarried, would name and form be born into this place?”“Miscarried” is vokkamissatha.
“State of existence” is itthattā, which is most commonly found in the declaration of the arahant that they will no longer be reborn into “this state of existence”.
Here “born” is abhinibbatti, which is listed along with jāti, okkanti, and other terms as a synonym in the standard definition of rebirth (SN12.2, MN9, DN22).
dn15:21.5“No, sir.”
dn15:21.6“If the consciousness of a young boy or girl were to be cut off, would name and form achieve growth, increase, and maturity?”The connection between dependent origination and childhood development is further explored in MN38.
dn15:21.7“No, sir.”
dn15:21.8“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of name and form, namely consciousness.
dn15:22.1‘Name and form are requirements for consciousness’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.Now we turn to the mirror side of the pair of conditions. If consciousness were not established in name and form, would the coming to be of the origin of suffering—of rebirth, old age, and death in the future—be found?”Just as name and form—the organic, sensual, and sense-making body—cannot grow without consciousness, so too consciousness must acquire a landing or grounding place to be “planted” in name and form.
Dukkhasamudayasambhavo (“the coming to be of the origin of suffering”) might be rendered “the coming to be and origin of suffering”. However, dukkhasamudaya occurs some hundreds of times in the sense “origin of suffering” so I take it in the same way here. This is supported by the PTS variant reading dukkhasamudayo sambhavo.
dn15:22.3“No, sir.”
dn15:22.4“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of consciousness, namely name and form.
This is the extent to which one may be reborn, grow old, die, pass away, or reappear.This passage continues to employ rare middle forms, this time -etha, the third person singular optative. This is how far the scope of labeling, terminology, and description extends; how far the sphere of wisdom extends; how far the cycle of rebirths spins so that this state of being may be found; namely, name and form together with consciousness.This passage explains why the sequence ends here rather than proceeding in the usual way to choices and ignorance. Any state of being ultimately depends on the codependency of name and form with consciousness. Within this key relationship is the extent not only of language, but also of wisdom, and the secret to the undoing of transmigration itself. One of the many profound implications of this is that there is no such thing as a state of pure consciousness independent of concepts.
Ettāvatā vaṭṭaṁ vattati itthattaṁ paññāpanāya should be read with such passages as SN22.56: ye kevalino vaṭṭaṁ tesaṁ natthi paññāpanāya (“For consummate ones, there is no cycle of rebirths to be found”).
In Chāndogya Upaniṣad 7.1.5, one who worships Divinity as name can do as they please “within the limits of name” (yāvannāmno gataṁ).
The Mahāsaṅgīti reading aññamaññapaccayatā pavattati is spurious, since it inserts an Abhidhamma concept from the commentary.
2. Describing the Self
dn15:23.1How do those who describe the self describe it?The text now turns to an analysis of theories of “self” (attā), which is comparable to some of the passages of DN1. The Buddha began his discourse by stating that it is the failure to understand dependent origination that keeps beings trapped in transmigration. Dependent origination explains transmigration in a purely empirical way by inferring from the mental and physical phenomena we experience here and now. Self theorists, on the other hand, explain transmigration by introducing a new metaphysical principle, the “self” or “soul”, by which they assume that the individual has an eternal underlying essence. They describe it as formed and limited:“Formed” is rūpī (“possessing form”), identifying the self with the first of the five aggregates. If something were really the core essence of a person, you would think it is readily knowable. But the Buddha shows that theorists describe the self in multiple different and incompatible ways. Each of these draws on some more-or-less arbitrary aspect of empirical reality, such as “form”, to describe an unknowable metaphysical entity that is in fact just pure supposition. ‘My self is formed and limited.’An example of a self that is “physical and limited” would be the body. Or they describe it as formed and infinite: ‘My self is formed and infinite.’Such as the cosmos. Or they describe it as formless and limited: ‘My self is formless and limited.’Perhaps this is the self of “limited perception” (DN1). This would be where the mind is aware of something limited, and the self is identified with the mental dimension of that awareness. Or they describe it as formless and infinite: ‘My self is formless and infinite.’Such as the formless dimensions.
dn15:24.1Now, take those who describe the self as formed and limited. They describe the self in the present as formed and limited; or they describe it as sure to be in some other place formed and limited; or else they think: ‘Though it is not like that, I will ensure it is provided with what it needs to become like that.’The three options (“it is”, “it will be so”, and “I will make it be so”) illustrate how the theorist resorts to ever more convoluted means to justify the lack of empirical support for their pet theory.
Bhāviṁ (“sure to become”) is the root bhū with the primary affix -ī, which connotes an inevitable future state.
Tattha (“in some other place”, literally “there”) is explained by the commentary as paraloke (“in the next world”). This being so, it’s appropriate to say that a view of self as formed and limited underlies them.Their surface differences rest on the same underlying assumption, so if the assumption is disproved there is no need to refute each individual theory.
Iccālaṁ resolves to iti alaṁ.
dn15:24.4Now, take those who describe the self as formed and infinite … formless and limited … formless and infinite. They describe the self as formless and infinite in the present; or as sure to become formless and infinite in some other place; or else they think: ‘Though it is not like that, I will ensure it is provided with what it needs to become like that.’ This being so, it’s appropriate to say that a view of self as formless and infinite underlies them.
That’s how those who describe the self describe it.
3. Not Describing the Self
dn15:25.1How do those who don’t describe the self not describe it?This is the Buddha, who does not theorize a metaphysical self. Implicit in this argument is Occam’s razor, “entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity”. Since the self theorists want to prove the existence of the “self”, it is up to them to supply the grounds to support their suppositions. Since they fail to do so, the rational position is that there is no self. The Buddha is not under a similar obligation to prove the non-existence of the “self”, since it is reasonable to assume that things do not exist until the evidence says otherwise. They don’t describe it as formed and limited … formed and infinite … formless and limited … formless and infinite: ‘My self is formless and infinite.’
dn15:26.1Now, take those who don’t describe the self as formed and limited … formed and infinite … formless and limited … formless and infinite. They don’t describe the self in the present as formless and infinite; or as sure to become in some other place formless and infinite; and they don’t think: ‘Though it is not like that, I will ensure it is provided with what it needs to become like that.’ This being so, it’s appropriate to say that a view of self as formless and infinite doesn’t underlie them.
That’s how those who don’t describe the self don’t describe it.
4. Regarding a Self
dn15:27.1How do those who regard the self regard it?Having asserted a metaphysical “self”, the theorists go on to make certain observations and interpretations regarding it. They regard feeling as self:The Buddha moves from theories of the self as form to feeling, the second of the five aggregates. ‘Feeling is my self.’For example, identifying the self with the supposed eternal bliss of heaven. As with the description of self in physical terms, the theorist proceeds from a simple assertion of identity to more complicated hypotheses. Or they regard it like this: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. My self does not experience feeling.’This is the inverse of the previous. The self is still defined in relation to feeling, but it is a negative relation. Such theories are commonly found in the Upaniṣads, where a prominent thread of analysis systematically rejects all the things that are not the self (neti), before finally arriving at what is the self (eg. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.15). Or they regard it like this: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. But it’s not that my self does not experience feeling. My self feels, for my self is liable to feel.’Here the theorist describes feeling as a function of the self: it is not what the self is, but what the self does. At MN38 (= MN2), Sāti describes the self as consciousness, “the speaker and feeler who experiences the results of good and bad deeds in all the different realms”.
dn15:28.1Now, as to those who say:The Buddha goes on to develop specific arguments addressing each position. ‘Feeling is my self.’ You should say this to them: ‘Reverend, there are three feelings: pleasant, painful, and neutral.The Buddha points out the universal experience of feeling, thus establishing his argument on common ground. This same argument is found at MN74. Which one of these do you regard as self?’
Ānanda, at a time when you feel a pleasant feeling, you don’t feel a painful or neutral feeling;The Buddha points out the universal experience of feeling, thus establishing his argument on common ground. This same argument is found at MN74. you only feel a pleasant feeling. At a time when you feel a painful feeling, you don’t feel a pleasant or neutral feeling; you only feel a painful feeling. At a time when you feel a neutral feeling, you don’t feel a pleasant or painful feeling; you only feel a neutral feeling.
dn15:29.1Pleasant feelings, painful feelings, and neutral feelings are all impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated, liable to end, vanish, fade away, and cease.
When feeling a pleasant feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their pleasant feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has expired.’ When feeling a painful feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their painful feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has expired.’ When feeling a neutral feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their neutral feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has expired.’
So those who say ‘feeling is my self’ regard as self that which is evidently impermanent, mixed with pleasure and pain, and liable to rise and fall. That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard feeling as self.
dn15:30.1Now, as to those who say: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. My self does not experience feeling.’ You should say this to them, ‘But reverend, where there is nothing felt at all, would the thought “I am” occur there?’”Feeling is part of the fundamental structure of consciousness. This argument comes through more clearly in Pali, for the word for “feeling” (vedanā) is derived from and still lies close to the sense of “knowing, experiencing”. Thus the question is, “If there was no mind, would there be the thought ‘I am this’?” The commentary explains that this refers to the bare material realm which is devoid of consciousness. The commentary appears to support the variant reading ahamasmī here. This makes sense in context, for “I am” is the first and most primordial assertion of a self, while “I am this” is a more sophisticated identification of the self in relation to the aggregates.
dn15:30.4“No, sir.”
dn15:30.5“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which does not experience feeling.
dn15:31.1Now, as to those who say: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. But it’s not that my self does not experience feeling. My self feels, for my self is liable to feel.’ You should say this to them, ‘Suppose feelings were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over. When there’s no feeling at all, with the cessation of feeling, would the thought “I am this” occur there?’”The theorist avoids identifying feeling as the self, but they must identify something as the self (as for example, Sāti said the self was viññāṇa). Feeling, however, is deeply wound into the structure of consciousness, so if feeling were to be utterly absent, no other mental phenomena could continue, and there would therefore be no possibility of forming a theory of self.
dn15:31.6“No, sir.”
dn15:31.7“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which is liable to feel.
dn15:32.1Not regarding anything in this way, they don’t grasp at anything in the world. Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished.Letting go is not just a conceptual matter, it has immediate emotional consequences. Paritassati conveys the twin senses of desire and agitation, for which “anxiety” seems the best fit. They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is nothing further for this place.’
dn15:32.5It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views: ‘A realized one still exists after death’; ‘A realized one no longer exists after death’; ‘A realized one both still exists and no longer exists after death’; ‘A realized one neither still exists nor no longer exists after death’.
dn15:32.10Why is that? A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far labeling and the scope of labeling extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’This recalls the similar statement above. Whereas there it was a statement about name and form with consciousness, here it is a description of the arahant who has fully realized it. Unlike the theorists whose views do not withstand empirical scrutiny, the arahant’s liberation is based on a direct understanding of reality.
5. Planes of Consciousness
dn15:33.1Ānanda, there are seven planes of consciousness and two dimensions.The Buddha returns once more to the question of rebirth, describing various states of rebirth in terms of consciousness. The seven planes are also mentioned at DN33, DN34, and AN7.44. What seven?
dn15:33.3There are sentient beings that are diverse in body and diverse in perception, such as human beings, some gods, and some beings in the underworld. This is the first plane of consciousness.“Plane of consciousness” is viññāṇaṭṭhiti, which could also be rendered “station”.
dn15:33.5There are sentient beings that are diverse in body and unified in perception, such as the gods reborn in the Divinity’s host through the first absorption. This is the second plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.7There are sentient beings that are unified in body and diverse in perception, such as the gods of streaming radiance. This is the third plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.9There are sentient beings that are unified in body and unified in perception, such as the gods of universal beauty. This is the fourth plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.11There are sentient beings that have gone totally beyond perceptions of form. With the disappearance of perceptions of impingement, not focusing on perceptions of diversity, aware that ‘space is infinite’, they have been reborn in the dimension of infinite space. This is the fifth plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.13There are sentient beings that have gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite space. Aware that ‘consciousness is infinite’, they have been reborn in the dimension of infinite consciousness. This is the sixth plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.15There are sentient beings that have gone totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness. Aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, they have been reborn in the dimension of nothingness. This is the seventh plane of consciousness.
dn15:33.17Then there is the dimension of non-percipient beings, and secondly, the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception.In the first of these dimensions there is no consciousness at all, and in the second there is no consciousness in the normal sense, which is why they cannot be called “planes of consciousness”.
dn15:34.1Now, regarding these seven planes of consciousness and two dimensions, is it appropriate for someone who understands them—and their origin, disappearance, gratification, drawback, and escape—to take pleasure in them?”Abhinandituṁ, to “take pleasure in”, to “relish”, or to “delight in” appears in the standard formula for the second noble truth, where craving “takes pleasure in various realms” (tatratatrābhinandinī).
dn15:34.3“No, sir.”
dn15:34.10“When a mendicant, having truly understood the origin, disappearance, gratification, drawback, and escape regarding these seven planes of consciousness and these two dimensions, is freed by not grasping, they’re called a mendicant who is freed by wisdom.One “freed by wisdom” has wisdom as the dominant faculty.
6. The Eight Liberations
dn15:35.1Ānanda, there are these eight liberations.The eight liberations (vimokkhā) are an alternative way of describing the meditative experiences of jhāna. Elsewhere they are listed at DN16, DN33, DN34, AN8.66, MN77, and referred to at AN4.189 and Therigatha 20. At AN8.120 and MN137 they are listed but not called the eight liberations. What eight?
dn15:35.3Having physical form, they see forms.Someone sees a meditative vision based on the perception of their own body, such as through mindfulness of breathing or one’s own body parts. The first three liberations all cover the four jhānas. This is the first liberation.
dn15:35.5Not perceiving form internally, they see forms externally.A meditator grounds their practice on some external focus, such as a light, the sight of a corpse, or an external element such as earth. This is the second liberation.
dn15:35.7They’re focused only on beauty.This is a practice based on wholly pure and exalted meditation, such as the meditation on love, or the sight of a pure brilliant color like the sky. This is the third liberation.
dn15:35.9Going totally beyond perceptions of form, with the disappearance of perceptions of impingement, not focusing on perceptions of diversity, aware that ‘space is infinite’, they enter and remain in the dimension of infinite space. This is the fourth liberation.
dn15:35.11Going totally beyond the dimension of infinite space, aware that ‘consciousness is infinite’, they enter and remain in the dimension of infinite consciousness. This is the fifth liberation.
dn15:35.13Going totally beyond the dimension of infinite consciousness, aware that ‘there is nothing at all’, they enter and remain in the dimension of nothingness. This is the sixth liberation.
dn15:35.15Going totally beyond the dimension of nothingness, they enter and remain in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. This is the seventh liberation.
dn15:35.17Going totally beyond the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, they enter and remain in the cessation of perception and feeling.The “cessation of perception and feeling” (saññāvedayitanirodha) is a culminating meditation state of supreme subtlety that often leads directly to awakening (but see AN5.166). The state itself, like all meditation states, is temporary, but afterwards the defilements can be eliminated forever. This liberating insight is the consequence of the balanced development of all eight factors of the path. This is the eighth liberation.
dn15:35.19These are the eight liberations.
dn15:36.1When a mendicant enters into and withdraws from these eight liberations—in forward order, in reverse order, and in forward and reverse order—wherever they wish, whenever they wish, and for as long as they wish;This passage emphasizes that this person is fully adept and has mastered all the states of meditation. The Buddha claimed such mastery (AN9.41), and retained the ability even on his deathbed (DN16). and when they realize the undefiled freedom of heart and freedom by wisdom in this very life, and live having realized it with their own insight due to the ending of defilements, they’re called a mendicant who is freed both ways.Here we see the terms “one who is freed” used in two ways. All arahants have “freedom of heart” (by means of samādhi) and “freedom by wisdom” (the realization of the Dhamma). At the same time, one who emphasizes samādhi is said to have “freedom of heart” in contrast with one who emphasizes wisdom, who has “freedom by wisdom”. One who has consummate mastery of both samādhi and wisdom is said to be “freed both ways”. And, Ānanda, there is no other freedom both ways that is better or finer than this.”
dn15:36.4That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, Venerable Ānanda approved what the Buddha said.
1. Paṭiccasamuppāda
1Evaṁ me sutaṁ — ekaṁ samayaṁ bhagavā kurūsu viharati kammāsadhammaṁ nāma kurūnaṁ nigamo.
Atha kho āyasmā ānando yena bhagavā tenupasaṅkami, upasaṅkamitvā bhagavantaṁ abhivādetvā ekamantaṁ nisīdi. Ekamantaṁ nisinno kho āyasmā ānando bhagavantaṁ etadavoca: "acchariyaṁ, bhante, abbhutaṁ, bhante. Yāva gambhīro cāyaṁ, bhante, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca, atha ca pana me uttānakuttānako viya khāyatī"ti.
"Mā hevaṁ, ānanda, avaca, mā hevaṁ, ānanda, avaca. Gambhīro cāyaṁ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso ca. Etassa, ānanda, dhammassa ananubodhā appaṭivedhā evamayaṁ pajā tantākulakajātā kulagaṇṭhikajātā muñjapabbajabhūtā apāyaṁ duggatiṁ vinipātaṁ saṁsāraṁ nātivattati.
2'Atthi idappaccayā jarāmaraṇan'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā jarāmaraṇan'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
3'Atthi idappaccayā jātī'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā jātī'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'bhavapaccayā jātī'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
4'Atthi idappaccayā bhavo'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā bhavo'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'upādānapaccayā bhavo'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
5'Atthi idappaccayā upādānan'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā upādānan'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'taṇhāpaccayā upādānan'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
6'Atthi idappaccayā taṇhā'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā taṇhā'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'vedanāpaccayā taṇhā'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
7'Atthi idappaccayā vedanā'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā vedanā'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'phassapaccayā vedanā'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
8'Atthi idappaccayā phasso'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā phasso'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'nāmarūpapaccayā phasso'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
9'Atthi idappaccayā nāmarūpan'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā nāmarūpan'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
10'Atthi idappaccayā viññāṇan'ti iti puṭṭhena satā, ānanda, atthītissa vacanīyaṁ. 'Kiṁpaccayā viññāṇan'ti iti ce vadeyya, 'nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan'ti iccassa vacanīyaṁ.
11Iti kho, ānanda, nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṁ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṁ, nāmarūpapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. Evametassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti.
Jarāmaraṇa
12"Jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṁ. Jāti ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — devānaṁ vā devattāya, gandhabbānaṁ vā gandhabbattāya, yakkhānaṁ vā yakkhattāya, bhūtānaṁ vā bhūtattāya, manussānaṁ vā manussattāya, catuppadānaṁ vā catuppadattāya, pakkhīnaṁ vā pakkhittāya, sarīsapānaṁ vā sarīsapattāya, tesaṁ tesañca hi, ānanda, sattānaṁ tadattāya jāti nābhavissa. Sabbaso jātiyā asati jātinirodhā api nu kho jarāmaraṇaṁ paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo jarāmaraṇassa, yadidaṁ jāti.
Jātī
13'Bhavapaccayā jātī'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā bhavapaccayā jāti. Bhavo ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — kāmabhavo vā rūpabhavo vā arūpabhavo vā, sabbaso bhave asati bhavanirodhā api nu kho jāti paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo jātiyā, yadidaṁ bhavo.
Bhava
14'Upādānapaccayā bhavo'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā upādānapaccayā bhavo. Upādānañca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — kāmupādānaṁ vā diṭṭhupādānaṁ vā sīlabbatupādānaṁ vā attavādupādānaṁ vā, sabbaso upādāne asati upādānanirodhā api nu kho bhavo paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo bhavassa, yadidaṁ upādānaṁ.
Upādāna
15'Taṇhāpaccayā upādānan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṁ. Taṇhā ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — rūpataṇhā saddataṇhā gandhataṇhā rasataṇhā phoṭṭhabbataṇhā dhammataṇhā, sabbaso taṇhāya asati taṇhānirodhā api nu kho upādānaṁ paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo upādānassa, yadidaṁ taṇhā.
Taṇhā
16'Vedanāpaccayā taṇhā'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā vedanāpaccayā taṇhā. Vedanā ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — cakkhusamphassajā vedanā sotasamphassajā vedanā ghānasamphassajā vedanā jivhāsamphassajā vedanā kāyasamphassajā vedanā manosamphassajā vedanā, sabbaso vedanāya asati vedanānirodhā api nu kho taṇhā paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo taṇhāya, yadidaṁ vedanā.
Paṭicca Taṇhā
17Iti kho panetaṁ, ānanda, vedanaṁ paṭicca taṇhā, taṇhaṁ paṭicca pariyesanā, pariyesanaṁ paṭicca lābho, lābhaṁ paṭicca vinicchayo, vinicchayaṁ paṭicca chandarāgo, chandarāgaṁ paṭicca ajjhosānaṁ, ajjhosānaṁ paṭicca pariggaho, pariggahaṁ paṭicca macchariyaṁ, macchariyaṁ paṭicca ārakkho. Ārakkhādhikaraṇaṁ daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādatuvaṁtuvaṁpesuññamusāvādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti.
18'Ārakkhādhikaraṇaṁ daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādatuvaṁtuvaṁpesuññamusāvādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavantī'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā ārakkhādhikaraṇaṁ daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādatuvaṁtuvaṁpesuññamusāvādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhavanti. Ārakkho ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso ārakkhe asati ārakkhanirodhā api nu kho daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādatuvaṁtuvaṁpesuññamusāvādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dhammā sambhaveyyun"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādatuvaṁtuvaṁpesuññamusāvādānaṁ anekesaṁ pāpakānaṁ akusalānaṁ dhammānaṁ sambhavāya yadidaṁ ārakkho.
19'Macchariyaṁ paṭicca ārakkho'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā macchariyaṁ paṭicca ārakkho. Macchariyañca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso macchariye asati macchariyanirodhā api nu kho ārakkho paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo ārakkhassa, yadidaṁ macchariyaṁ.
20'Pariggahaṁ paṭicca macchariyan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā pariggahaṁ paṭicca macchariyaṁ. Pariggaho ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso pariggahe asati pariggahanirodhā api nu kho macchariyaṁ paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo macchariyassa, yadidaṁ pariggaho.
21'Ajjhosānaṁ paṭicca pariggaho'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā ajjhosānaṁ paṭicca pariggaho. Ajjhosānañca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso ajjhosāne asati ajjhosānanirodhā api nu kho pariggaho paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo pariggahassa — yadidaṁ ajjhosānaṁ.
22'Chandarāgaṁ paṭicca ajjhosānan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā chandarāgaṁ paṭicca ajjhosānaṁ. Chandarāgo ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso chandarāge asati chandarāganirodhā api nu kho ajjhosānaṁ paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo ajjhosānassa, yadidaṁ chandarāgo.
23'Vinicchayaṁ paṭicca chandarāgo'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā vinicchayaṁ paṭicca chandarāgo. Vinicchayo ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso vinicchaye asati vinicchayanirodhā api nu kho chandarāgo paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo chandarāgassa, yadidaṁ vinicchayo.
24'Lābhaṁ paṭicca vinicchayo'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā lābhaṁ paṭicca vinicchayo. Lābho ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso lābhe asati lābhanirodhā api nu kho vinicchayo paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo vinicchayassa, yadidaṁ lābho.
25'Pariyesanaṁ paṭicca lābho'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā pariyesanaṁ paṭicca lābho. Pariyesanā ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, sabbaso pariyesanāya asati pariyesanānirodhā api nu kho lābho paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo lābhassa, yadidaṁ pariyesanā.
26'Taṇhaṁ paṭicca pariyesanā'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā taṇhaṁ paṭicca pariyesanā. Taṇhā ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā, sabbaso taṇhāya asati taṇhānirodhā api nu kho pariyesanā paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo pariyesanāya, yadidaṁ taṇhā. Iti kho, ānanda, ime dve dhammā dvayena vedanāya ekasamosaraṇā bhavanti.
Vedanā
27'Phassapaccayā vedanā'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā phassapaccayā vedanā. Phasso ca hi, ānanda, nābhavissa sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ kassaci kimhici, seyyathidaṁ — cakkhusamphasso sotasamphasso ghānasamphasso jivhāsamphasso kāyasamphasso manosamphasso, sabbaso phasse asati phassanirodhā api nu kho vedanā paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo vedanāya, yadidaṁ phasso.
Phassa
28'Nāmarūpapaccayā phasso'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā nāmarūpapaccayā phasso. Yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu … pe … tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho nāmakāye paṭighasamphasso paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Yehi, ānanda, ākārehi … pe … yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu … pe … tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho adhivacanasamphasso vā paṭighasamphasso vā paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Yehi, ānanda, ākārehi … pe … yehi uddesehi nāmarūpassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu … pe … tesu uddesesu asati api nu kho phasso paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo phassassa, yadidaṁ nāmarūpaṁ.
Nāmarūpa
29'Viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṁ.
Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṁ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ mātukucchismiṁ samuccissathā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṁ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, dāhārasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṁ vuddhiṁ virūḷhiṁ vepullaṁ āpajjissathā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa — yadidaṁ viññāṇaṁ.
Viññāṇa
30'Nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇan'ti iti kho panetaṁ vuttaṁ, tadānanda, imināpetaṁ pariyāyena veditabbaṁ, yathā nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṁ. Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṁ na labhissatha, api nu kho āyatiṁ jātijarāmaraṇaṁ dukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṁ nidānaṁ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññāṇassa yadidaṁ nāmarūpaṁ.
Ettāvatā kho, ānanda, jāyetha vā jīyetha vā mīyetha vā cavetha vā upapajjetha vā. Ettāvatā adhivacanapatho, ettāvatā niruttipatho, ettāvatā paññattipatho, ettāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, ettāvatā vaṭṭaṁ vattati itthattaṁ paññāpanāya yadidaṁ nāmarūpaṁ saha viññāṇena aññamaññapaccayatā pavattati.
2. Attapaññatti
31Kittāvatā ca, ānanda, attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti? Rūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti: 'rūpī me paritto attā'ti. Rūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti: 'rūpī me ananto attā'ti. Arūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti: 'arūpī me paritto attā'ti. Arūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti: 'arūpī me ananto attā'ti.
32Tatrānanda, yo so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti. Etarahi vā so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, rūpiṁ parittattānudiṭṭhi anusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
33Tatrānanda, yo so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti. Etarahi vā so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, rūpiṁ anantattānudiṭṭhi anusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
34Tatrānanda, yo so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti. Etarahi vā so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, arūpiṁ parittattānudiṭṭhi anusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
35Tatrānanda, yo so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti. Etarahi vā so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, arūpiṁ anantattānudiṭṭhi anusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
Ettāvatā kho, ānanda, attānaṁ paññapento paññapeti.
3. Naattapaññatti
36Kittāvatā ca, ānanda, attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti? Rūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti: 'rūpī me paritto attā'ti. Rūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti: 'rūpī me ananto attā'ti. Arūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti: 'arūpī me paritto attā'ti. Arūpiṁ vā hi, ānanda, anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti: 'arūpī me ananto attā'ti.
37Tatrānanda, yo so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti. Etarahi vā so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so rūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa na hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, rūpiṁ parittattānudiṭṭhi nānusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
38Tatrānanda, yo so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti. Etarahi vā so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so rūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa na hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, rūpiṁ anantattānudiṭṭhi nānusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
39Tatrānanda, yo so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti. Etarahi vā so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so arūpiṁ parittaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa na hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, arūpiṁ parittattānudiṭṭhi nānusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
40Tatrānanda, yo so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti. Etarahi vā so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, tattha bhāviṁ vā so arūpiṁ anantaṁ attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti, 'atathaṁ vā pana santaṁ tathattāya upakappessāmī'ti iti vā panassa na hoti. Evaṁ santaṁ kho, ānanda, arūpiṁ anantattānudiṭṭhi nānusetīti iccālaṁ vacanāya.
Ettāvatā kho, ānanda, attānaṁ na paññapento na paññapeti.
4. Attasamanupassanā
41Kittāvatā ca, ānanda, attānaṁ samanupassamāno samanupassati? Vedanaṁ vā hi, ānanda, attānaṁ samanupassamāno samanupassati: 'vedanā me attā'ti. 'Na heva kho me vedanā attā, appaṭisaṁvedano me attā'ti iti vā hi, ānanda, attānaṁ samanupassamāno samanupassati. 'Na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā'ti iti vā hi, ānanda, attānaṁ samanupassamāno samanupassati.
42Tatrānanda, yo so evamāha: 'vedanā me attā'ti, so evamassa vacanīyo: 'tisso kho imā, āvuso, vedanā — sukhā vedanā dukkhā vedanā adukkhamasukhā vedanā. Imāsaṁ kho tvaṁ tissannaṁ vedanānaṁ katamaṁ attato samanupassasī'ti?
Yasmiṁ, ānanda, samaye sukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, neva tasmiṁ samaye dukkhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, na adukkhamasukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti; sukhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti. Yasmiṁ, ānanda, samaye dukkhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, neva tasmiṁ samaye sukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, na adukkhamasukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti; dukkhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti. Yasmiṁ, ānanda, samaye adukkhamasukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, neva tasmiṁ samaye sukhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti, na dukkhaṁ vedanaṁ vedeti; adukkhamasukhaṁyeva tasmiṁ samaye vedanaṁ vedeti.
43Sukhāpi kho, ānanda, vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā. Dukkhāpi kho, ānanda, vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā. Adukkhamasukhāpi kho, ānanda, vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā paṭiccasamuppannā khayadhammā vayadhammā virāgadhammā nirodhadhammā.
Tassa sukhaṁ vedanaṁ vediyamānassa 'eso me attā'ti hoti. Tassāyeva sukhāya vedanāya nirodhā 'byagā me attā'ti hoti. Dukkhaṁ vedanaṁ vediyamānassa 'eso me attā'ti hoti. Tassāyeva dukkhāya vedanāya nirodhā 'byagā me attā'ti hoti. Adukkhamasukhaṁ vedanaṁ vediyamānassa 'eso me attā'ti hoti. Tassāyeva adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya nirodhā 'byagā me attā'ti hoti.
Iti so diṭṭheva dhamme aniccasukhadukkhavokiṇṇaṁ uppādavayadhammaṁ attānaṁ samanupassamāno samanupassati, yo so evamāha: 'vedanā me attā'ti. Tasmātihānanda, etena petaṁ nakkhamati: 'vedanā me attā'ti samanupassituṁ.
44Tatrānanda, yo so evamāha: 'na heva kho me vedanā attā, appaṭisaṁvedano me attā'ti, so evamassa vacanīyo: 'yattha panāvuso, sabbaso vedayitaṁ natthi api nu kho, tattha "ayamahamasmī"ti siyā'"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, etena petaṁ nakkhamati: 'na heva kho me vedanā attā, appaṭisaṁvedano me attā'ti samanupassituṁ.
45Tatrānanda, yo so evamāha: 'na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā'ti. So evamassa vacanīyo – vedanā ca hi, āvuso, sabbena sabbaṁ sabbathā sabbaṁ aparisesā nirujjheyyuṁ. Sabbaso vedanāya asati vedanānirodhā api nu kho tattha 'ayamahamasmī'ti siyā"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tasmātihānanda, etena petaṁ nakkhamati: 'na heva kho me vedanā attā, nopi appaṭisaṁvedano me attā, attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā'ti samanupassituṁ.
46Yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu neva vedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi appaṭisaṁvedanaṁ attānaṁ samanupassati, nopi 'attā me vediyati, vedanādhammo hi me attā'ti samanupassati. So evaṁ na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke upādiyati, anupādiyaṁ na paritassati, aparitassaṁ paccattaññeva parinibbāyati, 'khīṇā jāti, vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ, kataṁ karaṇīyaṁ, nāparaṁ itthattāyā'ti pajānāti.
Evaṁ vimuttacittaṁ kho, ānanda, bhikkhuṁ yo evaṁ vadeyya: 'hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī'ti, tadakallaṁ. 'Na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī'ti, tadakallaṁ. 'Hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī'ti, tadakallaṁ. 'Neva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṁ maraṇā itissa diṭṭhī'ti, tadakallaṁ.
Taṁ kissa hetu? Yāvatā, ānanda, adhivacanaṁ yāvatā adhivacanapatho, yāvatā nirutti yāvatā niruttipatho, yāvatā paññatti yāvatā paññattipatho, yāvatā paññā yāvatā paññāvacaraṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭaṁ, yāvatā vaṭṭati
, tadabhiññāvimutto bhikkhu, tadabhiññāvimuttaṁ bhikkhuṁ 'na jānāti na passati itissa diṭṭhī'ti, tadakallaṁ.
5. Sattaviññāṇaṭṭhiti
47Satta kho, ānanda, viññāṇaṭṭhitiyo, dve āyatanāni. Katamā satta?
Santānanda, sattā nānattakāyā nānattasaññino, seyyathāpi manussā, ekacce ca devā, ekacce ca vinipātikā. Ayaṁ paṭhamā viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā nānattakāyā ekattasaññino, seyyathāpi devā brahmakāyikā paṭhamābhinibbattā. Ayaṁ dutiyā viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā ekattakāyā nānattasaññino, seyyathāpi devā ābhassarā. Ayaṁ tatiyā viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā ekattakāyā ekattasaññino, seyyathāpi devā subhakiṇhā. Ayaṁ catutthī viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṁ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṁ amanasikārā 'ananto ākāso'ti ākāsānañcāyatanūpagā. Ayaṁ pañcamī viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma 'anantaṁ viññāṇan'ti viññāṇañcāyatanūpagā. Ayaṁ chaṭṭhī viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Santānanda, sattā sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma 'natthi kiñcī'ti ākiñcaññāyatanūpagā. Ayaṁ sattamī viññāṇaṭṭhiti.
Asaññasattāyatanaṁ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanameva dutiyaṁ.
48Tatrānanda, yāyaṁ paṭhamā viññāṇaṭṭhiti nānattakāyā nānattasaññino, seyyathāpi manussā, ekacce ca devā, ekacce ca vinipātikā. Yo nu kho, ānanda, tañca pajānāti, tassā ca samudayaṁ pajānāti, tassā ca atthaṅgamaṁ pajānāti, tassā ca assādaṁ pajānāti, tassā ca ādīnavaṁ pajānāti, tassā ca nissaraṇaṁ pajānāti, kallaṁ nu tena tadabhinanditun"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante"
… pe … "tatrānanda, yamidaṁ asaññasattāyatanaṁ. Yo nu kho, ānanda, tañca pajānāti, tassa ca samudayaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca atthaṅgamaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca assādaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca ādīnavaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca nissaraṇaṁ pajānāti, kallaṁ nu tena tadabhinanditun"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Tatrānanda, yamidaṁ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṁ. Yo nu kho, ānanda, tañca pajānāti, tassa ca samudayaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca atthaṅgamaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca assādaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca ādīnavaṁ pajānāti, tassa ca nissaraṇaṁ pajānāti, kallaṁ nu tena tadabhinanditun"ti?
"No hetaṁ, bhante".
"Yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu imāsañca sattannaṁ viññāṇaṭṭhitīnaṁ imesañca dvinnaṁ āyatanānaṁ samudayañca atthaṅgamañca assādañca ādīnavañca nissaraṇañca yathābhūtaṁ viditvā anupādā vimutto hoti, ayaṁ vuccatānanda, bhikkhu paññāvimutto.
6. Aṭṭhavimokkha
49Aṭṭha kho ime, ānanda, vimokkhā. Katame aṭṭha?
Rūpī rūpāni passati ayaṁ paṭhamo vimokkho.
Ajjhattaṁ arūpasaññī bahiddhā rūpāni passati, ayaṁ dutiyo vimokkho.
Subhanteva adhimutto hoti, ayaṁ tatiyo vimokkho.
Sabbaso rūpasaññānaṁ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṁ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṁ amanasikārā 'ananto ākāso'ti ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ catuttho vimokkho.
Sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma 'anantaṁ viññāṇan'ti viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ pañcamo vimokkho.
Sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṁ samatikkamma 'natthi kiñcī'ti ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ chaṭṭho vimokkho.
Sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṁ upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ sattamo vimokkho.
Sabbaso nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṁ samatikkamma saññāvedayitanirodhaṁ upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ aṭṭhamo vimokkho.
Ime kho, ānanda, aṭṭha vimokkhā.
50Yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu ime aṭṭha vimokkhe anulomampi samāpajjati, paṭilomampi samāpajjati, anulomapaṭilomampi samāpajjati, yatthicchakaṁ yadicchakaṁ yāvaticchakaṁ samāpajjatipi vuṭṭhātipi. Āsavānañca khayā anāsavaṁ cetovimuttiṁ paññāvimuttiṁ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṁ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati, ayaṁ vuccatānanda, bhikkhu ubhatobhāgavimutto. Imāya ca, ānanda, ubhatobhāgavimuttiyā aññā ubhatobhāgavimutti uttaritarā vā paṇītatarā vā natthī"ti.
51Idamavoca bhagavā. Attamano āyasmā ānando bhagavato bhāsitaṁ abhinandīti.
Mahānidānasuttaṁ niṭṭhitaṁ dutiyaṁ.